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Book Note

MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED
DISCLOSURE, by Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl E. Schneider1
DANIELLE Y. CORNACCIA
“TELLING PEOPLE MORE THAN THEY WANT TO KNOW in language they don’t

understand should not have legal consequences.”2 That proposition tells you
almost everything you need to know about More Than You Wanted to Know: The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure. In this entertaining book, Omri Ben-Shahar and
Carl E. Schneider critique the purpose and performance of mandated disclosure—a regulatory tool designed to help lay people make informed decisions
regarding various transactions while relieving disclosers of some legal liability.
An expectation that people “read the fine print”3 is largely an outgrowth
of the common law of contracts and torts. But the fine print can create a safe
harbour for otherwise careless disclosers. The authors define “disclosure” broadly.
Species of this regulatory tool include, for example, forms for informed consent
to health care, securities prospectuses, store return policies, copyright warnings,
food labels, mortgage documents, and even “disclosures reminding people that
comprehensive disclosures are available in writing.”4

1.
2.
3.
4.

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 229 pages.
Ibid at 195.
Ibid at 170.
Ibid at 28.
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Mandated disclosure is pilloried throughout the book’s three parts and
twelve chapters. Part one sketches the ubiquity of mandated disclosure, part
two tells the reader why disclosure fails, and part three asks whether mandated
disclosure can be saved. The short answer to the latter question is no; the authors
think mandated disclosure is mostly hopeless. And the focus of their work is to
explain why disclosure is hopeless rather than to offer a regulatory panacea in
disclosure’s place.
So why, then, is disclosure ubiquitous? This regulatory tool “resonates
with two fundamental American ideologies,”5 the free-market principle and
the autonomy principle. In the first case, “Markets work best when buyers are
informed; disclosures inform them.”6 In the second case, “People are entitled
as a matter of moral right and of practical policy to make the decisions that
shape their lives.”7
Why does disclosure fail? The authors respond with a review of empirical
research suggesting that “mandated disclosure rests on false assumptions about
how people live, think, and act … [and] about how well information improves
decisions.”8 The research is based mainly in behavioural economics, and the
examples discussed are exclusively American. Studies suggest that people
tend to be averse to decision making, to lack the competencies necessary to
understand disclosures, to be paralyzed by the amount of information provided
by disclosures, and to make irrational inferences no matter the amount or quality
of information provided. For example, one study found only 15 per cent of
shareholders reported reading the whole prospectus required under securities
law.9 Behavioral economists have also noticed that “things vivid and disturbing
are more readily remembered than things drab and routine.”10 This so-called
availability bias has incited “some people [to] pay more for insurance against
terrorism than for insurance against a slate of risks that includes terrorism.”11 For
these and other reasons, “[d]eciding not to be informed and not to use disclosures
is often patently rational.”12
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Ibid at 5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 12.
Ibid at 68.
Ibid at 110.
Ibid.
Ibid at 56-57 [emphasis in the original].
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One might infer that mandated disclosure is harmless, albeit useless. But
the authors argue that it is “not harmless if its costs outweigh its benefits.”13 A
key mischief of mandates is that they “obscure the difference between revealers
(good guys who volunteer information) from concealers (bad guys who must be
forced).”14 The fact that there is no clear substitute for disclosure is not a reason
to continue mandating disclosure. The authors thus urge lawmakers “not to use
a failed regulatory method.”15 What people really need, according to the authors,
is advice from suitably experienced individuals (e.g., lawyers, product reviewers)
rather than disclosure.
In sum, Ben-Shahar and Schneider paint a grim picture of disclosure as
resembling el Requerimiento—a Spanish-language text that was read by colonial
Spaniards to non-Spanish-speaking Indigenous people in the New World asking
them to “acknowledge the Church as the ruler and superior of the whole world,”
lest they wish to face war.16 If the cited passages suggest nothing else, it is that the
authors have written an engaging, down-to-earth and accessible book, which adds
to a vibrant literature exploring the limits of both paternalistic and libertarian
approaches to regulatory decision-making.17
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Ibid at 169.
Ibid at 173.
Ibid at 184.
Ibid at 195.
See e.g. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and
the Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Cass R Sunstein,
“Empirically Informed Regulation” (2011) 78:4 U Chicago L Rev 1349; Lauren E Willis,
“Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price”
(2006) 65:3 Md L Rev 707.

